The goal of this paper is to explain the complexity of evaluative experiences. As a result of this explanation, some related issues will be addressed that are crucial for current debates pro and con value realism. This goal is met by tapping the resources of a phenomenological investigation, dealing with different types of intentional experiences, their inherent structure, object-related achievements, and reason-giving force. Within a suitably rich phenomenological framework, experiences are analyzed in accordance with both a static-synchronic and a genetic-diachronic view. In the present paper, I argue that in any single occurrence of an evaluative experience, these two perspectives are inextricably interwoven and continuously interact with one another. Focusing on the intended object, these two perspectives manifest themselves as a double horizon of meaning constitution which is implicitly entailed in any presently enacted evaluative experience. The relating key questions are: How can evaluative experiences successfully address values bottom-up in a corrigible and intersubjectively shareable manner? How does this possibility match with the phenomenological insight that original valuation hinges upon acts that immediately and feelingly grasp value properties instantiated in a variety of different objects?
Typically, a phenomenology of valuation sparks off objections concerning the allegedly merely subjective character of the relating intentional experiences. These objections are part of an overarching debate in which various value subjectivist positions are opposed to various value objectivist positions. Value objectivism usually is conjoined with value realism. Although elaborating on a comprehensive conception of value realism goes beyond the scope of this paper, my line of reasoning has relevant implications for the debate at issue. First, there are negative implications. Which strategies of advocating a realist position are unpromising if one claims to consistently argue from a Husserlian point of view? Second, as far as positive statements are concerned, I suggest that the above investigation can be spelled out in terms of a phenomenologically based perspectival realism.