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Disjunctivism unmotivated
pp. 355-372
Abstract
Many naive realists are inclined to accept a negative disjunctivist strategy in order to deal with the challenge presented by the possibility of phenomenologically indistinguishable hallucination. In the first part of this paper I argue that this approach is methodologically inconsistent because it undercuts the phenomenological motivation that underlies the appeal of naive realism. In the second part of the paper I develop an alternative to the negative disjunctivist account along broadly Meinongian lines. In the last section of this paper I consider and evaluate a somewhat similar but rival view of hallucination developed by Mark Johnston.
Publication details
Published in:
(2014) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2).
Pages: 355-372
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-013-9304-4
Full citation:
Knight Gordon (2014) „Disjunctivism unmotivated“. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2), 355–372.