Each of Husserl's "introductions" begins with the development of a set of problems whose ultimate treatment requires transcendental phenomenology. Despite whatever differences there may be between the "introductions" in this regard, there is one problem which emerges in all of them, namely, the problem of cognition of the world. This problem is only partially developed in each of the "introductions," each adding components lacking in the others or concentrating on aspects only alluded to in them. The complete elaboration of this problem fills out the first part of the schema of the "introductions." My treatment of this part of Husserl's "introductions" will be relatively brief. It is only intended to serve the following functions: 1) to provide a general view of the larger philosophical context within which the theory of consciousness as world-constitutive appears; 2) to indicate how each of the "introductions" contributes to the development of the problem of cognition; 3) to yield the idea of the correlation between subjective apriori on the one hand, and objective eidos and objective kind on the other.