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Relevance, science, and the social sciences
pp. 204-228
Abstract
We now turn to that province of meaning which Schutz called "the World of Scientific Theory."1 In the following chapter, after first describing the most general features of the province of scientific theory in terms of systems of relevance, we will discuss and then briefly criticize one aspect of Schutz's theory of the social sciences.
Publication details
Published in:
Cox Ronald (1978) Schutz's theory of relevance: a phenomenological critique. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 204-228
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-9695-3_6
Full citation:
Cox Ronald (1978) Relevance, science, and the social sciences, In: Schutz's theory of relevance, Dordrecht, Springer, 204–228.