Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, Russell, in 1918–19, and Moore, in 1910–11, advocated a variant of a correspondence theory of truth that reveals basic problems faced by correspondence theories. To speak of a theory of truth is to speak of an ontological account or assay that specifies a ground of truth or truth maker. It isnot to speak of the mere introduction of a truth predicate into a schema in such a way as to avoidparadoxes or mimic the apparent univocal use of the phrase "is true' in ordinary speech, while specifying a mechanism for handling molecular and quantified formulae. To offer a philosophical theory of truth is not merely to specify the truth condition for an atomic formula, "Fa' for example, by a transcription such as "a has F' or "a belongs to the class of things that are F' or "π has f', where "π' and "f ' are metalinguistic correlates of "a' and "F'. This is not to deny that such concerns play a role in setting out a theory of truth; it is only to insist that to provide a philosophical account or analysis requires that one specify what a ground of truth is.