(…) Mill, when writing about names, asks whether it is more proper to consider names as names of things or as names of our representations of things.¹ (…) The word "Sun" — according to Mill — is a name of the Sun, and not the name of representation of the Sun; he does not deny, however, that a name evokes in, or conveys to, a listener only a representation, and not the thing itself. The function of a name thus appears to be twofold: a name conveys to a listener the content of a representation, and at the same time names an object. But we have been persuaded that we must distinguish three, and not two, elements of every representation: the act, the content, and the object. If a name really gives an exact linguistic image (Bild) of the corresponding mental relations, then it must also have a correlate of the act of representation. This does in fact happen, and the three elements of a representation: the act, the content, and the object, have counterparts in the triple task which every name has to perform.