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189669

Definitions, conventions and empirical judgments

Moritz Schlick

pp. 69-79

Abstract

Every judgment we make is either definitional or cognitive. This distinction, as we noted above (§ 8), has only a relative significance in the conceptual or "ideal" sciences. It emerges all the more sharply, however, in the empirical or "real" sciences. In these sciences it has a fundamental importance; and a prime task of epistemology is to make use of this distinction in order to clarify the kinds of validity possessed by various judgments.

Publication details

Published in:

Schlick Moritz (1974) General theory of knowledge. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 69-79

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_11

Full citation:

Schlick Moritz (1974) Definitions, conventions and empirical judgments, In: General theory of knowledge, Dordrecht, Springer, 69–79.