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Conclusions
pp. 215-218
Abstract
This chapter delineates the limits of the dialectical argument against epistemic relativism. In particular, the argument is not a response to Pyrrhonian scepticism, nor is it a response to the underdetermination and semantic arguments for epistemic relativism. If it succeeds only in undermining the principal argument for epistemic relativism, then it will have done its job.
Publication details
Published in:
Bland Steven (2018) Epistemic relativism and scepticism: unwinding the braid. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
Pages: 215-218
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-94673-3_10
Full citation:
Bland Steven (2018) Conclusions, In: Epistemic relativism and scepticism, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 215–218.