Repository | Series | Book | Chapter
The dialectical structure of value judgments
pp. 175-195
Abstract
In this chapter, I utilize the dialectical structure of value judgment provided by Gewirth and Habermas's theories in order to show that deontic concepts and their correlative judgments are logically and semantically intertwined with aretaic concepts. Importantly, however, deontic concepts are necessarily dependent upon aretaic concepts for their content and meaningfulness.
Publication details
Published in:
Petro Stephen (2014) Rationality, virtue, and liberation: a post-dialectical theory of value. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 175-195
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-02285-7_4
Full citation:
Petro Stephen (2014) The dialectical structure of value judgments, In: Rationality, virtue, and liberation, Dordrecht, Springer, 175–195.