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177849

(How) can law be legitimated?

Habermas, Rawls, Dworkin

Ludwig Nagl

pp. 131-142

Abstract

For Habermas, contrary to what the legal positivists and system theorists believe, law requires legitimation (and thus is dependent on the discourse of morality) in post-traditional societies too, even if no natural-law metaphysics satisfies that desideratum. Habermas is aware that neither the appeal to a classical "philosophy of subjectivity" nor a notion of "de-limited communication" is capable of supplying the necessary legitimation. In his book Faktizität und Geltung 1, it is this basic dilemma that constitutes the problem to which a "discourse theory of law" seeks the answer.

Publication details

Published in:

Pauer Studer Herlinde (1994) Norms, values, and society. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 131-142

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-2454-8_10

Full citation:

Nagl Ludwig (1994) „(How) can law be legitimated?: Habermas, Rawls, Dworkin“, In: H. Pauer Studer (ed.), Norms, values, and society, Dordrecht, Springer, 131–142.