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Towards a eudaimonistic virtue epistemology

Berit Brogaard

pp. 83-102

Abstract

This chapter is about the science of vision and memory in relation to virtue epistemology. My argument will turn on the point that the mechanisms underlying vision and knowledge that, according to current neuroscience, remain non-conscious can't be considered virtuous mechanisms even if they are highly reliable. Hence, I argue, virtue epistemology cannot count these obvious forms of knowledge as true forms of knowledge. Virtue epistemology thus is at best a partial theory of knowledge.

Publication details

Published in:

Fairweather Abrol (2014) Virtue epistemology naturalized: bridges between virtue epistemology and philosophy of science. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 83-102

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_6

Full citation:

Brogaard Berit (2014) „Towards a eudaimonistic virtue epistemology“, In: A. Fairweather (ed.), Virtue epistemology naturalized, Dordrecht, Springer, 83–102.