In a recent work, Dennett examines a series of empirical findings in neurology and psychology of perception and maintains that "in certain time spans, the distinction between pre-experiential and post-experiential content revisions cannot be maintaine"d(Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992, 192). He claims instead that the "multiple draft theor"y which he advocates, makes the identification of a particular "moment of processing in the brain as the moment of consciousnes"'sarbitrary" (194). My aim here is reviewing the conflicting hypotheses in order to assess Dennett & Kinsbourne's skeptical conclusion. While doing so, I hope to clarify the notions of experience and of consciousness, and more generally the relationship between neural and mental properties. I will first summarize some of the startling results of neurosurgeon Benjamin Libet which triggered a philosophical controversy in the late seventies and early eighties. I will then discuss two of the conflicting views, Ted Honderich's and Patricia Churchland's, which will allow me to suggest a reformulation of Libet's hypothesis. A final discussion will deal with Dennett and Kinsbourne's solution.