Repository | Book | Chapter

189271

An ambiguity in Egan's concept of belief

L. Jonathan Cohen Jonathan Cohen

pp. 365-367

Abstract

A distinction has to be drawn between the concept of belief and the concept of acceptance. Even though the English words belief and acceptance may not have sufficiently uniform uses to carry the whole weight of the distinction, at least they ought not to be used interchangeably in this context: the underlying differences in conception are quite important. The main points to be noted are as follows, but further consequences are explored in Cohen (1983a).

Publication details

Published in:

Mos Leendert (1986) Annals of theoretical psychology. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 365-367

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4615-6453-9_26

Full citation:

Cohen L. Jonathan, Cohen Jonathan (1986) „An ambiguity in Egan's concept of belief“, In: L. Mos (ed.), Annals of theoretical psychology, Dordrecht, Springer, 365–367.