In Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (1992) Iris Murdoch criticizes "a sort of plausible amoralistic determinism" that she associates with Jacques Derrida (MGM, p. 198). But a good deal of what she has to say about Derrida is problematic in various ways. First, it reverses her treatment of Derrida in The Fire and the Sun (1977),¹ where he is briefly introduced not as a target but as an ally in the struggle against those who set aside the pursuit of truth. Second, it directs our attention away from the possibility of using Derrida to win new insights into Murdoch's novels — particularly those novels, such as The Black Prince (1973), where the omniscience of the narrator is placed in question. And finally, it is problematic because of the ambiguity of her targeting and because of its conspicuous lack of textual support. At times, Murdoch's reading of Derrida is so loose that it is no longer clear that he is the main object of her criticism.