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A semantic definition of proposition in terms of truth and falsity
pp. 45-59
Abstract
In De Interpretatione Aristotle states a necessary condition for the application of the word "proposition". He writes: "We call propositions those only that have truth or falsity in them. A prayer is, for instance, a sentence but neither has truth nor has falsity".1
Publication details
Published in:
Gochet Paul (1980) Outline of a nominalist theory of propositions: an essay in the theory of meaning and in the philosophy of logic. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 45-59
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-8949-8_4
Full citation:
Gochet Paul (1980) A semantic definition of proposition in terms of truth and falsity, In: Outline of a nominalist theory of propositions, Dordrecht, Springer, 45–59.