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The proposition in terms of belief
pp. 87-100
Abstract
In "On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean" (1919), Russell foresaw a way of approaching the problem of defining the proposition and of determining its ontological status that we have not yet discussed. The paper opens with the following statement: "A proposition may be defined as: What we believe when we believe truly or fasely".1 Several contemporary philosophers have preceded or followed Russell along this path full of obstacles.
Publication details
Published in:
Gochet Paul (1980) Outline of a nominalist theory of propositions: an essay in the theory of meaning and in the philosophy of logic. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 87-100
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-8949-8_7
Full citation:
Gochet Paul (1980) The proposition in terms of belief, In: Outline of a nominalist theory of propositions, Dordrecht, Springer, 87–100.