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206095

Maimon's "quid facti" argument

Yaron Senderowicz

pp. 176-199

Abstract

Maimon's "quid facti" argument is traditionally regarded as his most serious objection to Kant's transcendental philosophy, its conclusion being that Kant's theory of experience is inadvertently compatible with Hume's skepticism. He esteems Kant's painstaking analysis of the concept of experience as one of the supreme achievements of the human mind, comparable to Euclid's.1 Nevertheless, Kant's resp

Publication details

Published in:

Freudenthal Gideon (2003) Salomon Maimon: rational dogmatist, empirical skeptic: critical assessments. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 176-199

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-2936-9_8

Full citation:

Senderowicz Yaron (2003) „Maimon's "quid facti" argument“, In: G. Freudenthal (ed.), Salomon Maimon: rational dogmatist, empirical skeptic, Dordrecht, Springer, 176–199.