The discussions of the last twenty years concerning the empiricist criterion of factual meaningfulness have increasingly emphasized the need for a more liberal formulation. Positivists, old and new, adamant in their repudiation of metaphysics, have tended to overshoot their goal. The motivation was of course understandable and, on the whole, admirable. The decision to eliminate from scientific and philosophical discourse the kind of problems which, because of their very conception cannot possibly be solved in a responsible manner, had an eminently salutary and cathartic effect. There is certainly no point in worrying one's head about questions which are supposed to concern matters of fact and yet cannot conceivably be answered (at least partially or indirectly) by appeal to the data of observation. We are all too familiar with the dialectic devices designed to protect the claims of transcendent knowledge against refutation. Such devices have been utilized in the arguments not only of outright theology and metaphysics but frequently enough also in the frontal areas of the expanding scientific enterprise itself. Speculations about absolute space and time, substance, the ether, causal necessity, entelechies, telefinalities, groupminds, etc., are apt to become devoid of whatever (no matter how vaguely) specifiable meaning they may have had to begin with. They are rendered proof against disproof by a simple but often rather concealed or unwitting decision to make them immune against the outcome of any conceivable test.