In what follows, I shall restrict myself to remarks with regard to two different, although related claims of Lorenz. I am not going to discuss all the allusions and implications of his paper. It is only the critical analysis of Kantian transcendentalism and the concept of a unified science I shall be concerned with. Equally, I am not interested right from the start to dispute the bipartite scheme of "ars judicandi" and "">ars inveniendi" which serves as the background for everything Lorenz has to say in the paper. In the course of my argument, however, I shall have to question the legitimacy of this scheme which echoes the old subject-object-dualism all through the terminology of its exposition (person-oriented, matter-oriented e.g.). It will turn out — at least I hope it will — that such a dualistic scheme is inadequate for rendering or criticizing the Kantian position of transcendental philosophy. Furthermore it will become clear — or, again, I hope it will — that the claim of the "Konstruktive Wissen-schaftstheorie" to be the successor to transcendentalism is ill-grounded. In treating this school, which German provincialism has labelled "Erlanger Schule", I shall make use of the writings¹ of Janich, Lorenzen and Mittelstrass besides the paper at hand.