Since the start of the nineteen si xties, some Kant scholars have had occasion to note — in the words of Stephan Körner — the "great revival of Kant's ideas and modes of thought in analytical philosophy and in other philosophical movements".²And indeed, after the publication in 1966 of some famed essays by Jaakko Hintikka on the transcendentalist view of mathematics and of the celebrated book by Peter F. StrawsonThe Bounds of Sense. An Essay on Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason " "numerous works, often characterized by a fecund intertwining of historical and theoretical perspectives, have appeared on the subject. But this renewed interest has not given rise to an overall re-promotion of Kant's epistemology; on the contrary, the appearance of important points of contact has generally gone together with a corresponding stress on no less important points of divergence. The "New Philosophy of Science", for example, has been marked by a strong revaluation of the theoretical and constructive aspect which is present in all the components of scientific knowledge, even in the ones closer to empirical observation; and this belongs of course to a Kantian philosophical tradition. But these same epistemological orientations have also criticized any absolute idea of reason ("as Kant's largely and not incidentally was), its presumed theoretical contents and its methodological prescriptions; in short, they have criticized its anti-empiricist pretences to discipline "from above" the development of scientific knowledge without taking into due account the empirical, historical and biological conditioning of it.⁴