The ontological and sociological corollaries of epistemological stances have recently been emphasised by Bhaskar in his critique of phenomenalism (1). Views as to the nature of scientific knowledge, he points out, involve certain assumptions about the nature of the world and the nature of a society which produces that knowledge. While logically necessary connections between ontological, epistemological and sociological commitments such as those traced by Bhaskar need not occur empirically, in the sense that particular groups adhere to a logically coherent set of beliefs, there are certain combinations of commitments, types of knowledge and patterns of social organisation which are more empirically likely than alternative combinations. The institutionalisation of a particular theoretical ideal in the sciences has sociological consequences which affect the future production of knowledge. Furthermore, that institutionalisation itself occurs under particular social circumstances which might not be so favourable to alternative theoretical ideals. While, then, not being directly concerned with the mutual relations of aspects of philosophical doctrines and systems, a major focus of the sociology of the sciences should, I suggest, be to consider how particular social arrangements are consonant with particular theoretical ideals and lead to the production of particular types of knowledge.