As there were two approaches to natural language which we noted in Chapter One, there are roughly two seemingly opposing camps regarding the notion of reference. For convenience I shall again label these the logician's view and the speech act theorist's view. According to the logician's view, reference is a relation between words and the world; however the link may be forged, there is a link between certain expressions of the language and certain entities. "Nine" refers to the number nine, "Bertrand Russell" to Bertrand Russell, and so on. This picture appears to be muddied a bit by the last-mentioned philosopher, who held that definite descriptions weren't really referring expressions at all, but denoting expressions, expressions that disappear at the level of logical analysis. But as we saw in the final section of Chapter 1, this is really part and parcel of the same view, since the claim is that sentences containing expressions of the form "the (ϕ" link up with objects in a certain way too — it's just that the linkage is different from the one that operates with names.