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The fallacies of the new theory ofr eference

Jaakko HintikkaPaul-Gabriel Sandu

pp. 245-283

Abstract

The so-called New Theory of Reference (Marcus, Kripke etc.) is inspired by the insight that in modal and intensional contexts quantifiers presuppose nondescriptive unanalyzable identity criteria which do not reduce to any descriptive conditions. From this valid insight the New Theorists fallaciously move to the idea that free singular terms can exhibit a built-in direct reference and that there is even a special class of singular terms (proper names) necessarily exhibiting direct reference. This fallacious move has been encouraged by a mistaken belief in the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers, by the myth of thede re reference, and a mistaken assimilation of “direct reference” to ostensive (perspectival) identification. Thede dicto vs.de re contrast does not involve direct reference, being merely a matter of rule-ordering (“scope”).

Publication details

Published in:

(1995) Synthese 104 (2).

Pages: 245-283

DOI: 10.1007/BF01063872

Full citation:

Hintikka Jaakko, Sandu Paul-Gabriel (1995) „The fallacies of the new theory ofr eference“. Synthese 104 (2), 245–283.