In my contribution, I will argue for the thesis that an interpretation of Husserl’s concept of the inner and outer horizon is best explicated in a context of meaning (Sinn) and not in a context of things. I will demonstrate that this interpretation has the advantage of allowing for better comparison of different horizons and illustrating how they are related without referring to an object. By shifting the focus from the things to the horizon, one can better analyse the relation between the “different worlds” such as the relation between the lifeworld and the scientific world. This procedure has the advantage of focusing on the respective “worldview”.
In the first part, I will provide two indirect arguments for my thesis. Firstly, I will show that an object-oriented interpretation of the inner horizon leads to contradictions, especially in the pre-predicative sphere. Secondly, I will demonstrate that Husserl is negatively influenced by his object-oriented thinking in describing the outer horizon. He emphasises temporal and local relations in thematising the outer horizon. In doing so, he can’t explain relations of similarity and therefore types. For that, he must focus on meaning relations. I will conclude this part by summarising the thesis that the distinction between inner and outer horizon has to be banished in pre-predicative sphere.
In the second part, I will offer my interpretation that horizons can be described as meaning relations. I will demonstrate that an object is not necessary to show how the inner and outer horizon are differentiated and related. To do this, I will analyse Husserl’s concepts of the material a priori and type and demonstrate how these implicit norms “rule” the references (Verweise). The relations between the two can be explicated by thematising the context and the possible references referring to each other.