The phenomenological experience of the world – whereby the world is correlative to one’s consciousness or understanding (Verstehen)—is inextricable from an affective background (Befindlichkeit). Taking this insight into account, I will analyse a fundamental modification of the affective experience of the world in the case of people suffering from schizophrenia. I will argue that the fundamental belief in the existence of the world (Urdoxa) is accompanied by a primal mood, an “existential feeling” (M. Ratcliffe), specific to the natural attitude, which can be described as trust (N. de Warren). In other words, the world is posited as being when it is being trusted in the first place. Conversely, in schizophrenic modification of self- and world-experience, the basic mood accompanying one’s alienation from the common-sense (W. Blankenburg) will be interpreted as a fundamental mistrust. The failure of trust, which defines the psychotic wariness, bears an intersubjective or social character. Such an analysis, which takes the (mis)trust as the core of subject’s relation to the world, can have not only a theoretical import, but also a practical one, specifically within the field of medical humanities. Theoretically, in taking moral emotions (A. Steinbock), such as trust, to be fundamental for schizophrenic experience, one would have to acknowledge the essentially intersubjective grounding of mental affliction. In this regard, it is not possible to give a phenomenological account of the psychotic experience within the immanent sphere of consciousness. As a result, from the practical point of view, one would have to embrace the idea that the social world is able to shape subject’s mental state in a critical way. In the final analysis, I will argue that creating a space of trust for those bearing a radical mistrust in the world should be an essential prerequisite in their therapeutic process.