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Maimon's subversion of Kant's critique of pure reason
there are no synthetic a priori judgments in physics
pp. 144-175
Abstract
Maimon characterized his philosophical position as "rational dogmatism and empirical skepticism" (Tr, II, 436). In this paper I concentrate on the latter half of this description, and argue that Maimon's empirical skepticism subverts and jeopardizes Kant's project in the Critique of Pure Reason.1
Publication details
Published in:
Freudenthal Gideon (2003) Salomon Maimon: rational dogmatist, empirical skeptic: critical assessments. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 144-175
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-2936-9_7
Full citation:
Freudenthal Gideon (2003) „Maimon's subversion of Kant's critique of pure reason: there are no synthetic a priori judgments in physics“, In: G. Freudenthal (ed.), Salomon Maimon: rational dogmatist, empirical skeptic, Dordrecht, Springer, 144–175.